Abstract-RF fingerprinting exploits the variations in the RF chain of radios to uniquely identify transmitters, and distinguish adversarial transmissions from the transmissions of legitimate nodes. We provide a systematic approach rooted from the information theory to evaluate the basic performance limits of RF fingerprinting. We develop a novel channel model for RF fingerprinting, where the imperfections in the RF chain are modeled as a fingerprint channel, cascaded to the actual physical channel. We address the authentication problem in the presence of an adversary, where both the legitimate transmitter and the adversary are equipped with unique fingerprint channels, in addition to a possible secret key available at the legitimate nodes. We provide bounds for the error exponents for reliable communication of the legitimate nodes, and the success exponent for impersonation and substitution attacks of the adversary, as a function of certain parameters based on their RF-fingerprints, and the shared key rate. We illustrate that keyless authentication is possible via RF fingerprints when the legitimate channel is not simulatable. We also show that the probability of these attacks can be reduced significantly by employing additional dedicated authenticated nodes.
I. INTRODUCTION
A UTHENTICATION is the act of confirming the identity of a device, person, or software. Authentication between two devices can be achieved by exploiting various sources of common randomness that cannot be reproduced by an adversary. In practice, authentication is typically performed via secret key bits that are assumed to be available exclusively to the legitimate nodes [3] . However, this assumption translates the problem of authentication to another problem of secret key generation in an unauthenticated framework. Furthermore, authentication is compromised if the keys are captured by a malicious adversary. Recent works have sought other methods for authentication. For instance, wireless channel based authentication [4] exploits the characteristics of multipath fading to authenticate a transmitter. Another recently proposed method is to exploit the RF Fingerprints of the transmitters. It has been shown that even different radios of the same make and brand preserve different characteristics, due to unique imperfections in digital-analog converters and power amplifiers [5] . These imperfections can be utilized to authenticate legitimate nodes.
RF-Fingerprinting based authentication has become popular due to the fact that it is user dependent: RF-fingerprint is a known and static input-output characteristic of the RF-chain 1 of the transmitter, that does not depend on temporal factors, such as user location, or channel propagation characteristics. This is in contrast with the wireless channel based fingerprints, which is a random mapping that does not depend on the transmitter characteristics, but depends on the user location and channel propagation characteristics. Therefore, wireless channel based authentication systems typically make a strong assumption on user stationarity [6] , which makes them inapplicable in many practical scenarios.
Various algorithms have been proposed in the literature to exploit the RF Fingerprints for authentication. These approaches can be considered in two categories; transient based implementations [5] , [7] , [8] perform classification based on the amplitude/phase characterization of the signal envelope, and modulation based implementations [9] perform classification based on frequency offset, sync correlation, etc. However, the answers to the following questions are yet to be completely answered: i) When is RF-fingerprint based authentication possible with high probability? ii) How can RF-fingerprint based, key based and (wireless channel based) 2 authentication be combined? iii) What are the (upper and lower) bounds on the probability of authentication error for the best scheme?
In order to provide answers to these questions, we consider an information theoretic approach to RF-fingerprinting, in a point-to-point authentication framework, shown in Figure 1 . The transmitter attempts to communicate a message to the legitimate receiver in the presence of an active adversary. We assume that the legitimate transmitter and the receiver potentially have access to a shared key, which is secure Fig. 1 . An authentication system with an adversary that is capable of an impersonation or substitution attack, the choice of which is controlled via two compound switches.
from the adversary. The transmitter, receiver and adversary are connected to each other via channels W t , W j and W e . These channels model the input-output relationships between the encoder output signal and decoder input signal, therefore they also include the RF-Fingerprints, i.e., imperfections in the RF-chains. These imperfections resemble an abstract channel, whose statistics do not change in time. We model these imperfections as RF-fingerprint channels cascaded to the physical channel. Also, in our model there are two compound switches, that are assumed to be under the control of the adversary via an arbitrary strategy. Using these switches, the adversary may choose to either
• Not interfere with the legitimate communication by keeping switch 1 open, and switch 2 connected to the legitimate channel W t , which we denote as no attack.
• Initiate an impersonation attack by keeping switch 1 open, and switch 2 closed on the adversary channel W j . In this case, the adversary attempts to inject a message, without listening to the legitimate transmission.
• Initiate a substitution attack by keeping switch 1 closed on the eavesdropping channel W e , and switch 2 closed on the adversary channel W j . The main difference from the impersonation attack is that the adversary listens to the legitimate transmission before injection, therefore obtains some information about the shared key, and choose its coding strategy accordingly. We assume that the receiver does not know the state of the switches. Based on its received signal, it either detects that the adversary is initiating an attack by declaring an erasure, or it detects that no attack has occurred, i.e., the signal originated from the legitimate receiver, and it decodes the transmitted message. A success occurs in case of correct decoding, otherwise an error occurs. For instance, impersonation attack success occurs if the adversary performs an impersonation attack, and the receiver falsely detects that no attack has occurred, and successfully decoded the adversary's injected message. Similarly, we define other events, e.g., no attack success, no attack error, substitution attack error, etc. Our technical contributions could be expressed as follows:
• We provide lower and upper (achievable) bounds on the exponents of erasure, error, impersonation success, impersonation (undetected) error, substitution success, and substitution error probabilities in Section IV-A. We illustrate that there is a trade-off between probabilities of success under an attack, and error under no attack. A special case of our model has been studied by Lai et al. in [10] , where it is assumed that (i) the adversary to receiver channel W j is noiseless, therefore RF-fingerprints do not exist, and authentication is performed solely with the aid of the shared key, (ii) the eavesdropping channel W e is less noisy than the main channel W t , i.e., the secrecy capacity of the wiretap channel formed by W t and W e is positive, 3 and (iii) the shared key size does not scale with block length. Our approach does not require any of these assumptions:
We show in Section IV-C that we can obtain Lai's results as a special case where channel W j is noiseless. Furthermore, we show that authentication is possible in this special case, even when W e is less noisy compared to W t .
• We model the RF-fingerprints as a prefix channel, 4 cascaded to the physical channel. We show that keyless authentication is possible if and only if the legitimate channel is not simulatable by the adversary, a condition we introduce on Section IV, which is similar to the condition introduced by Maurer for the source model [14] . Under this condition, communication at any rate below main channel capacity is possible, with exponentially decaying probabilities of substitution and impersonation. We also provide a graphical approach to confirm whether the adversary can simulate the legitimate channel.
• We study a cooperative scheme that utilizes authenticated nodes that send binary signals to the legitimate receiver, to indicate their guess on whether the received signal came from the legitimate transmitter. We derive achievable bounds for error and attack probability exponents with such cooperation. For the special case of keyless authentication (i.e., when the transmitter and receiver does not share any secrecy key), we show that for a successful attack, the adversary has to simulate all of the legitimate channels simultaneously.
• In part of achievable exponents proof of Theorem 1, we evaluate the secrecy exponent 5 in the form of L ∞ norm, for constant composition codes. Secrecy exponents in the form of mutual information have been evaluated in [17] , however the approach cannot be directly extended to constant composition codes. Our approach, developed in Appendix A, utilizes the technique of moments of distance enumerators introduced in [18] , and it could be of interest beyond the context of security.
A. Related Work i) Authentication problem was first studied from a theoretical point of view by Simmons [19] for a special case of Figure 1 , where all of the channels are noiseless (i.e., without any RF-fingerprints). His analysis, which relied on secret key based authentication, has been extended to different settings over the years, see e.g. [10] , [20] . To the best of our knowledge, none of the extensions included RF-fingerprints. We provide a brief overview in Section III.
ii) Arbitrarily Varying Channels model communication channels with unknown parameters which may vary with time in an arbitrary and unknown manner during the transmission of the codeword, possibly under the influence of an adversary This channel is especially more suitable to model substitution attacks in a wireless setting, where the equivalent channel is a function of both the transmitter and adversary signal. However, the existing studies ( [21] - [23] and the references therein) only focus on reliable communication.
iii) Information hiding problems (see [24] - [26] , and the references therein) study the problem of hiding a message into a covertext signal under a distortion constraint. For instance, Alice, who shares a key with Bob, hides a message to a music file in such a way the music file is still playable (not significantly distorted), and the message is recoverable only by Bob. Eve, not having access to this key, distorts the message in an arbitrary manner to make the message unrecoverable by Bob. The main differences from our work are i) the legitimate channel and eavesdropping channel are not separate. The adversary is assumed to intercept the coded signal, and modify it on some attack channel. ii) The attack channel has some constraints (e.g., limited distortion). iii) The imperfections of the legitimate channels (RF-fingerprints) are not exploited.
II. NOTATION AND SYSTEM MODEL

A. Notation
We mainly follow the notation in Csiszar and Korner (see [11, Secs. 2 and 10] ). Random variables are denoted by capital letters, whereas their realizations are denoted by lower case letters, (finite size) alphabets are denoted by calligraphic letters, and random vectors of size n are denoted by boldface letters. We consider the model depicted in Figure 1 . Vector
n is the signal transmitted by the legitimate transmitter over n channel uses, whereas z ∈ Z n is the signal received by the adversary, when switch 1 is closed. Vector q ∈ Q n represents the injected signal by the adversary in case of an attack, and y ∈ Y n is the signal received by the legitimate receiver. We denote the probability of an event using letter P. For alphabets X , and Y, we use the notation P(X ) to denote the set of valid probability distributions on the set X , and use the notation P(Y|X ) to denote the set of conditional probability distributions from X to Y. The discrete memoryless channels in Figure 1 (as explained in Section II-B) are conditional probability distributions, e.g., the legitimate channel W t ∈ P(Y|X ), the eavesdropping channel channel W e ∈ P(Z|X ), and the jamming channel W j ∈ P(Z|Q).
The type of a sequence x ∈ X n is a probability distribution P ∈ P(X ), which satisfies the equality 1 n (a|x) = P(a), ∀a ∈ X (see [11, Definition 2.1.]), where (a|x) denotes the number of occurrences of letter a ∈ X in the vector x. We denote the set of vectors of type P and length n by T P (and omit n to simplify notation). Similarly, the conditional type a vector y ∈ Y n given x ∈ X n is a conditional probability distribution V ∈ P(Y|X ), which satisfies
where (a, b|x, y) denotes number of indices where letters a and b occurs simultaneously in vectors x and y, respectively (see [11, Definition 2.4] ). We define the set of vectors of conditional type V as T V (x) (omit n as it is clear from context). In this paper, entropy, mutual information and KL-divergence are defined as functions of probability distributions, rather than random variables. This allows us to use the same notation to refer to these measures and their empirical counterparts. For instance, for a random variable X with probability distribution P ∈ P(X ), we use H (P) ≡ H (X) = − a∈X P(a) log P(a) to denote its entropy, and for a deterministic vector x of type P(X ), we use n H (P) to denote its empirical entropy.
For a random variable X with distribution P ∈ P(X ), and for channel W t ∈ P(Y|X ), an output random variable Y obtained by passing X through channel W t follows the probability distribution PW t ∈ P(Y), where
The mutual information of the random variables X and Y can be represented as a function of these distributions
Similarly, for a vector x ∈ T P (i.e., of type P ∈ P(X )), and a vector y ∈ T V (x) (i.e., of conditional type V ∈ P(Y|X ) given x), the type of vector y is actually PV ∈ P(Y), where PV is defined similarly to (2) , and the empirical mutual information between vectors x and y is equal to n I (P, V ). The KL-divergence between two conditional distributions V ∈ P(Y|X ) and W t ∈ P(Y|X ) conditioned on P ∈ P(X ) is defined as
We denote expectation over a random variable X as
We assume that all entropies and logarithms are to the base e, and rates are in nats/channel use.
B. RF Fingerprints and Channels
As discussed in Section I, the RF fingerprints are inputoutput relationships that are unique to each radio, due to the non-linearities of the power amplifiers and the imperfections of the filters. Consequently, each transmitter-receiver pair has a distinct input-output behavior, even over the same physical wireless channel. 6 Since such effects are due to the hardware manufacturing process, they are time-invariant. 7 Therefore, we model the RF-fingerprint as a static channel whose statistics do not vary in time, cascaded to the wireless channel, as shown in Figure 2 . Note that, authentication based on RF-fingerprints is different from authentication based on wireless channel based fingerprints, whose statistics vary dynamically based on the user location and propagation characteristics. Wireless channel based authentication typically require a strong assumption on user stationarity [6] , unlike the RF-fingerprinting based systems.
In this paper, for the ease of exposition of the results we restrict ourselves to the case where all (RF-fingerprint and physical) channels are discrete memoryless channels (DMC). In reality, RF-fingerprint channels are continuous, and they have memory due to the non-linearities in the power amplifiers. Also, wireless channels are clearly time-varying. Yet, our results provide an intuition on the effects of RF-fingerprints on authentication in general. The nature of the results are unchanged by all the complexities associated by these vagaries, and we believe that these complexities would make it significantly more difficult to communicate. Extending our results to the general case is part of our future work.
The RF fingerprint of the transmitter and the adversary are denoted as RF fingerprint channels W t, f and W j, f , respectively, and the channels between transmitter to receiver, transmitter to adversary, and adversary to receiver are denoted as as W t,c , W e,c and W j,c , respectively. Therefore, the equivalent channels are formed via a cascade of RF fingerprint channels and physical channels, i.e.,
where * is the convolution operator, i.e.,
We assume that the receiver perfectly knows the equivalent transmitter channel (W t ), yet it has no information about the other channels (i.e., W j , W e ). All analytical results in this paper are provided in terms of W t , W e and W j . We will revisit the fingerprint notation in Section VI.
C. Coding and Attack Model
The legitimate transmitter wants to send a message m ∈ {1, . . . , e n R M } to the legitimate receiver, in the presence of the adversary. They are assumed to share a key k ∈ {1, . . . , e n R K } beforehand. To that end, they utilize a code c = ( f, φ) as follows. The transmitter encodes the message m to x = f (m, k) via a mapping f , and transmits x over the channel. The receiver obtains signal y, and extractŝ m = φ(y, k) ∈ {0, 1, . . . , e n R M } via a decoding function φ, where 0 corresponds to an erasure. As discussed in Section I, there are three modes of operation, depending on the positions of the compound switches in Figure 1 , which are controlled by the adversary. 1) No Attack: Switch 2 is closed on the main channel W t .
2) Impersonation Attack: Switch 1 is open, and switch 2 is closed on the jammer channel W j . To inject a fake messagem, the adversary transmits a signal q, independent of the transmitter's signal x, through an arbitrary mapping q = f 2 (m), which after passing through W j , yields y. 3) Substitution Attack: In contrast with the impersonation attack, switch 1 is also closed. The adversary intercepts x = f (m, k) through the channel W e and receives z.
To injectm, the adversary encodes q = f 2 (m, z) via an arbitrary mapping f 2 (which can be random), and transmits q over the channel W j , which yields y. We define the error events for these three cases. For no attack, we define the following events, conditioned on the fact that
where s na , α na and ε na denote success, erasure and (undetected) error events, respectively. For impersonation attack, we similarly define the events, conditioned on the fact that key is k, and adversary transmits q = f 2 (m)
Finally, for substitution attack, events are based on the fact that x = f (m, k) is intercepted by the adversary, that transmits q = f 2 (m, z)
Note that, the error events defined above also depend on the codebook c = ( f, φ), inherently the block length n, and adversary attack scheme f 2 (·) described above. To keep the notation simple, we do not explicitly show the dependence of the error events on c, n and f 2 . 
under any arbitrary adversary attack strategy (mapping) f 2 , where M,M ∈ {1, . . . , e n R M }, K ∈ {1, . . . e n R K } are independent and uniformly distributed random variables. The expectation of the error event probabilities over the transmitted message M, injected messageM, and the shared key K indicates that we are interested in the averages of these probabilities, i.e., (7) is the probability that erasure or undetected error event occurs, averaged over M,M and K . Please refer to [11] and [21] for a comparison over average and maximum probability of error constraints.
We are especially interested in the exponential rate of decay of the probability expressions in (7)- (9) . We will use capital letters to refer to these exponents, and use underline and overline to refer to the liminf and limsup, respectively, e.g.,
We will also use the notation
to refer to the sphere packing exponent [11] ; the maximum error exponent achievable via any constant composition codebook. 8 We also define the inverse of the sphere packing function as
III. KEY BASED AUTHENTICATION BASICS Fundamental limits in key based authentication were first studied by Simmons [19] . He considered a special case of the system given in Figure 1 , where the channels W t , W j and W e are all noiseless, i.e., all the wireless channels are perfect, and there are no RF-fingerprints. When switch 1 is closed, the adversary receives Z = X, and when switch 2 is closed on the main channel, the legitimate receiver obtains Y = X. For this noiseless case, he arrived at two fundamental conclusions:
• To avoid impersonation attacks, the ciphertext X needs to contain some information about the key K : Otherwise, knowing the codebook, the adversary can inject a valid codeword through the noise free jamming channel W j , and the legitimate receiver has no way of distinguishing whether the signal originated from the transmitter or the adversary. In fact, Simmons showed that the probability of impersonation attack for any authentication scheme is lower bounded as
As an example, consider a scheme where the transmitter reveals the entire key K as part of the signal X, e.g., X = [M, K ]. In this case, to impersonate the transmitter, the attacker needs to guess the key correctly, which happens with probability e −H (K ) = e −I (K ;X) , i.e., this scheme achieves the lower bound on impersonation. However, this scheme is not secure against substitution attacks, as we will see next.
• To avoid substitution attacks, the key K should not be completely determined from adversary's received signal: Simmons showed that the probability of substitution attack for any authentication scheme in the noise free case is lower bounded as P S P(s sub ∪ ε sub ) ≥ e −H (K |X) . For the previous example where the transmitter reveals the entire key as part of the signal, the adversary obtains K perfectly when it receives signal Z = X. Therefore, knowing the key, it can successfully perform a substitution attack, i.e., inject a false message which would be viewed by the receiver as authentic. Clearly, there is a trade-off between minimizing impersonation and substitution attack probabilities: Some information about the key need to be revealed to the legitimate receiver to avoid impersonation, which at the same time should be kept hidden from the adversary to avoid substitution. Simmons' results illustrate that for any authentication scheme, (substitution or impersonation) attacks would be successful with probability at least P attack max(P I , P S ) ≥ e −H (K )/2 . For example, one can break the key K into two parts, K 1 and K 2 of equal size, and use K 1 against impersonation attacks and K 2 against substitution attacks. Combining the two bounds above, the new bound on authentication probability becomes clear.
Surprisingly, better bounds may be found when the channels are noisy. Under certain scenarios, one can even develop simple schemes to achieve these bounds (which is not necessarily possible for Simmons' bounds). Recently, Lai et. al. revisited the authentication problem for the case where channels W t and W e are noisy, and W j is noise-free. Recall that when W e is not less noisy than W t , the secrecy capacity of the wiretap channel formed by W t and W e is positive [11] . Unlike the noiseless case, by utilizing the wiretap channel, it is possible to transmit the key K to the legitimate receiver, while keeping it secret from the adversary. From a different point of view, the wiretap channel acts as a source of key required to hide K from the adversary. Lai et. al. showed that for this scheme, P attack . = e −H (K ) is asymptotically achievable (i.e., upper and lower bounds coincide as the block length n → ∞). This result provides us a scheme that is asymptotically optimal. One issue with this approach is that, authentication is possible only if the legitimate nodes have access to a secret key K . If the adversary intercepts the key through other means (e.g., via hacking the legitimate transmitter device), it can successfully launch an attack. Another issue is that, their scheme requires a positive secrecy capacity of the wiretap channel, and the knowledge of the statistics of W e . However, their initial assumption, that W j is perfect, is too strict in general, since they ignore the RF-fingerprints of the adversary. In Section IV, we address these drawbacks, via exploiting these RF-Fingerprints.
IV. RESULTS
In Section IV-A, we provide lower and upper (achievable) bounds on the exponents. In Section IV-B, we simplify these bounds, via loosening and adding further constraints inspired by RF-fingerprinting. Then, in Section IV-C we show that, keyless authentication is possible if and only if the legitimate channel is not simulatable by the adversary, which will be defined shortly. Furthermore, under this condition, communication at any rate below main channel capacity is possible. We also show that we can obtain Lai's results as a special case where channel W j is noiseless. Furthermore, we show that authentication is possible even when W e is less noisy compared to W t .
Before providing our results, we introduce the following notation and definitions. First, for a given conditional probability mass function Q ∈ P(Q|X ), we define W j Q Q * W j , i.e.,
which can be interpreted as if the adversary passes its transmitted signal through a discrete memoryless prefix channel Q. Definition 2 (Simulatability and η):
Then, the adversary can simulate the legitimate channel if η = 0, i.e., there is some W j Q such that
Otherwise, the legitimate channel is not simulatable. Simulatability is illustrated via a graphical approach in Section VI.
A. Bounds on Exponents
Let us split rate R K into two, such that
we define the operator ≺ such that for any two conditional types V andV , V ≺V , the following condition holds:
The operator ≺ depends on the parameter ξ , rates R K 1 and R M , and the distributions P and W t . In order to keep the notation simple, we do not explicitly show these dependencies in the operator. A similar operator also appears in [27] .
Theorem 1 (Achievable Exponents): For any
there exists a coding scheme c = ( f, φ) that achieves the exponents
E sub ≥ t key + t r f e (18)
under any adversary attack scheme f 2 , where
where in (21) 
, minimization is over all possible conditional types V andV in P(Y|X ) such thatV ≺ V , and in the first term of t r f s , minimization is over all possible conditional types V such that there exist someV that satisfies the condition V ≺V .
The proof is provided in Appendix A. In Section IV-B, we simplify the bounds by loosening them, and interpret the effects of RF-fingerprinting on authentication. Here, we first explain the terms in (15)- (20), then briefly explain our achievability scheme. Our scheme provides all error exponents for a given erasure exponent of ξ (i.e., erasure probability of e −nξ ) under no attack. In this case, the undetected error exponent is t ena . Substitution attack success and error probabilities are a sum of two terms. The first term, t key is the exponent term that comes into play due to exploiting secret keys for authentication. Recall from the discussion in Section III in key based authentication, the key needs to be communicated securely. In case of an impersonation attack, i.e., when the adversary is not listening on the eavesdropping channel, keys can be completely utilized for authentication, hence t key ≤ R K 1 holds. The second term, t r f s , short for RF-Fingerprint (attack) success, is the term that appears due to exploiting the RF-Fingerprints for authentication. Similarly, the term t r f e is short for RF Fingerprinting (attack) error.
Our scheme to avoid substitution attacks has the same motivation of [10] as it makes use of the wiretap channel between the legitimate nodes. However, our wiretap code is significantly different from that is commonly used in the literature: We split the key K of rate R K into two parts,
We utilize a 3 dimensional binning scheme, 9 where keys K 1 and K 2 span two dimensions, whereas the message M span the other; each codeword is indexed with m, k 1 and k 2 . We use wiretap coding arguments to hide K 1 from the adversary, while K 2 is used to improve the secrecy rate, i.e., help us hide K 1 from the adversary. In order to exploit the RF-fingerprints for authentication, we utilize an errors and erasures decoder which resembles Telatar's decoder [27] , tuned to the legitimate channel W t . Decoder states are illustrated in Figure 3 , for the case where keys k 1 and k 2 are shared, when message m is transmitted. An erasure is declared if one of the two conditions occur: 1) A codeword corresponding to a false key k 1 = k 1 is decoded: Note that wiretap coding approach allows us to communicate k 1 securely, hence when the adversary intercepts the signal via switch 1, it has limited knowledge of the key k 1 . In contrast to Lai's approach, we do not use part of the key (k 2 ) for authentication. We use it to ensure that k 1 is transmitted securely, even when W e is less noisy than W t (as opposed to [10] ). In other words, we use K 1 for authentication, whereas we use K 2 for secrecy.
2) The empirical channel statistically deviates from W t beyond a certain threshold, controlled by parameter ξ : The message is decoded if the empirical channel V satisfies (14) , as illustrated in Figure 4 . When ξ is chosen smaller, the decoder is more likely to declare erasure, and when ξ is chosen larger, the decoder is more likely to decode a codeword m ∈ {1, . . . , e n R M }. Similarly, an (undetected) error occurs if a codeword corresponding to the correct k 1 , but false m = m is decoded. It is not trivial to evaluate exponents for impersonation/substitution attacks, due to two reasons:
• The adversary strategy is arbitrary; when it receives the signal z, it may choose any (possibly random) mapping f 2 (q|m, z) to inject messagem.
• A substitution success may occur when the adversary estimates the keys incorrectly, i.e.,k i = k i , then injects the corresponding codeword corresponding to (k 1 ,k 2 ,m), yet due to noise in the channel W j , the decoder incorrectly decodes the received signal as an authentic codeword,
In other words, an incorrect guess of the keys at the adversary, combined with an erroneous decoding at the receiver, can cause the injected message to be falsely authenticated. In our analysis, we bound the substitution attack success probability by the product of two terms; the probability of most likely k 1 , and the probability of successful injection given the adversary knows k 1 . Note that, the first term can be used as a benchmark for secrecy exponent. We bound this term via moments of distance enumerators [18] . To our knowledge, this is the first study that evaluates secrecy exponents for constant composition coding. Thus, our approach could be of interest beyond the context of security.
In Section IV-B, we will show that, when the eavesdropper cannot simulate the legitimate channel, its empirical channel realization deviates from W t , such that the probability of attack decay exponentially, i.e., the terms (17)- (20) are positive. Furthermore, we can see that there is a trade-off between erasure (16) and attack success (17) probability, which is tunable via parameter ξ , as we will illustrate in Section VI.
Theorem 2 (Upper Bound): For any constant composition coding scheme c = ( f, φ) of type P, such that for any m, f (m, k) = x km , x km ∈ T P , the following inequality holds:
Furthermore, when there is no shared key (R K = 0), and condition (13) holds for some η < 1, (25) can be further bounded as
Proof is provided in Appendix C. The theorem states that for any constant composition based scheme, erasure exponent (limsup) given no attack (A na ), error exponent given no attack (E na ) and success exponent given substitution (S sub ) cannot simultaneously exceed a certain threshold.
B. Simplifying Bounds
In Section IV-A, we provided bounds for exponents related to success, erasure and error probabilities under no attack, impersonation and substitution attacks. However, it is not easy to numerically evaluate them in general, since in (21)-(24), the maximization is over both V andV , each of which has |X ||Y| dimensions; product of input and output alphabet cardinalities. Consequently, we cannot foresee when authentication is possible, since it is not easy to see whether the exponents (15)- (20) are zero. In this section, we simplify these bounds. First, we obtain looser bounds which are expressed in terms of sphere packing exponents, and an optimization over single dimensional space in Corollary 1. Via Blahut-Arimoto Algorithm, sphere packing exponents can be efficiently evaluated (see problem 10.8 in [29] ). Then, we further relax the bounds in Corollary 2, which provides us conditions for which the exponents (21)-(24) are positive. These results are utilized in Section IV-C to show the necessity of non-simulatability for RF-Fingerprint based authentication.
Corollary 1 (Simplifying the Exponents in Theorem 1): Let P(a * ) = max a∈X P(a), and define
Then, t ena ≤ t ena , t r f s ≤ t r f s and t r f e ≤ t r f e .
Proof: Note that the inequality t ena ≤ t ena was also proven in [27] . Here, we prove that t r f s ≤ t r f s . Notice that there are two terms in big parentheses in t r f s We first focus on the second term. Due to Definitions (10) and (11),
To bound the first term in parentheses in t r f s , let V andV be such that V ≺V . Then, from (14),
where (34) follows from Pinsker's inequality. Similarly, we can write
where (36) follows from triangle inequality, and (37) follows from (34) and (13) . Combining (32) and (37), we can see that t r f s ≤ t r f s . Proof of the inequality t r f e ≤ t r f e follows similarly, and is omitted.
Corollary 2 (Positivity of the Exponents): There exists some R * > 0 such that for any R M and R K 1 that satisfy 
Furthermore,
In Lemma 10.4 of [11] , it is shown that for any distribution P and W , there exists a minimum rate R inf ≥ 0, such that in the interval [R inf , I (P, W )], the sphere packing exponent E sp (R, P, W ) defined in (10) is a convex and strictly decreasing function of R, and satisfies the following equality
In other words, in (10), the minimizing V is on the boundary,
is also a convex and strictly decreasing function of ξ for ξ ≤ ξ sup . Based on this, we can see that there exists a minimum rate R * (P, W ) such that
since function E sp (R, P, W t ) is decreasing with slope greater than −1 for R > R * (P, W t ) and function E −1 sp (P, W t ) is increasing with slope less than −1 for ξ < ξ * (P, W ).
Since we also assume that Proof: When there is no shared key, R K 1 = R K 2 = 0, and t key = 0. From Corollary 2, it is clear that t ena > 0 and t r f e > 0 for for rates R M such that I (P, W t ) > R M > R * , for some threshold R * . It is clear that when the adversary cannot simulate the legitimate channel, the parameter η in (13) is positive, therefore from Corollary 2, and the fact that
Therefore, all exponents in Theorem 1 are positive, which implies according to Definition 1 that reliable communication is possible. The converse follows since when η = 0, both channels are identical. When W j Q (c|a) = W t (c|a) for any a, c, for any coding scheme ( f, φ) such that P(s na ) ≥ 1 − , it can be seen that P(s imp ) ≥ 1 − as well.
2) Authentication Solely Based on Keys:
Here, we retrieve the result of Theorem 1 the special case where the adversary jamming channel W j is noiseless, and compare the results with Lai [10] . We can safely assume that for any y ∈ Y, q ∈ Q, W j (y|q) = 1 if y = q, and 0 otherwise. It is clear that for this case, t r f s = t r f e = 0 since min Q D(V W j Q |P) = 0 which can be obtained by choosing Q = V , then W j Q = Q * W j = V . We can see that S sub ≥ t key , E sub ≥ t key where
which is positive as long as R > I (P, W e ). Recall from Corollary 2 that t ena is positive as long as R M + R K 1 < I (P, W t ). Therefore, we can see that even when I (P, W t ) < I (P, W e ), success probability exponent is positive.
To observe Lai's result, note that when R < I (P, W e ), there exist some R K 1 small enough such that, t key = R K 1 , hence P(s sub ) ≤ e −n R K 1 . If we publicly provide the adversary, all but some finite portion B K 1 bits of the key K 1 , then we can see that the substitution success probability becomes P(s sub ) ≤ e −B K 1 .
V. COOPERATION VIA PRE-AUTHENTICATED NODES
In this section, we study the setup in Figure 5 , where we assume that there are T − 1 pre-authenticated helper nodes, which receive the signals on their corresponding channels. They assist the legitimate receiver only to verify whether the signal came from the legitimate transmitter as a result of no attack, or from the adversary as a result of an impersonation, or substitution attack, but not in decoding the message. The helper nodes provide their guesses to the legitimate receiver 1, via private 1-bit AUTH or NOT_AUTH messages. We show that, via a minor modification in our achievability scheme in Theorem 1, better exponents are achievable. Furthermore, for the keyless case, in order to successfully launch an (impersonation/substitution) attack the adversary needs to simultaneously simulate all legitimate channels, a condition that is more difficult to satisfy compared to simulatability.
The attacker model is similar to Section II-C. When no attack occurs, node 1, the legitimate receiver, receives the signal through channel W t 1 , and the helper nodes h ∈ {2, . . . T } receive the signal through their corresponding channels W t h . In case of an impersonation and/or substitution attack, the adversary injects a signal q on the jamming channels W j 1 , . . . , W j T to all the receiving nodes, including the helpers.
Before providing our results, we define simultaneous simulatability. 
Q(b|a)W j h (c|b) = W t h (c|a), ∀a, c
We also define a variation of the operator ≺ defined in (14) , for the multiple helper case. For any node h ∈ {1, . . . , T } (including the legitimate receiver 1, and helper nodes 2, . . . , T ), we define the operator ≺ h such that for any two conditional types V andV , we say that V ≺ hV if the condition 
D(V W t h |P) + |I (P,V ) − (R
where minimizations are over Q ∈ P(Q|X ), and terms t ena , t key are as provided in (21), (22), respectively, and t na , t re are defined as
t re (h, Q) min min
The proof is provided in Appendix D. Our achievability scheme is very similar to the achievability scheme in Theorem 1. Each helper node h ∈ {2, . . . , T } employ an erasures decoder, that target an erasure exponent of ξ . In other words, helper node h declares an erasure and sends a NOT_AUTH packet if its empirical channel statistically deviates from W t h beyond a certain threshold, controlled by parameter ξ . If at least one node (including the legitimate receiver and the helpers) declares an erasure, then the legitimate receiver declares an erasure. The exponent achievable for the erasure in the no-attack case is the same as that in Theorem 1. The reason is that, for the multiple helper case, the erasure probability is at most T times the erasure probability of the single receiver case, due to the union bound. Since T is a constant, and does not scale exponentially with n, it does not have any effect on these exponents. We can see that the presence of helper nodes has a significant effect on the RF-Fingerprinting (attack) success and undetected error terms. 
Corollary 4 (Multi Helper Authentication Without Keys): When there is no shared key between the legitimate nodes (i.e., R K
= 0, K = ∅),
VI. NUMERICAL EVALUATION
In this section, we illustrate our findings in a numerical example. We consider all channels to be ternary, and choose the transition probabilities (in matrix form) as (5) . For this example, we first study whether keyless authentication is possible. Recall that, Corollary 3 ties keyless authentication to simulatability condition. Here, we provide a graphical approach to check simulatability. The transition probability matrices can be uniquely determined from the first |Y|−1 = 2 indices, which are plotted in Figure 6 . Using a discrete memoryless prefix channel Q, the adversary can achieve any point inside the triangle that points of W j form by creating the equivalent jamming channel W j Q = Q * W j , as in (12) . The convex hull of points of W j is called the simulatability region. If any point of W t falls outside the simulatability region, then W t is not simulatable, which is indeed the case for our numerical example. Furthermore, parameter η in (13) is equal to the maximum of the L − 1 distances from the points of W t to the simulatability region, which is equal to η = 0.0453 in our example. Since W t is not simulatable, keyless authentication, based on solely the RF-Fingerprints is possible due to Corollary 3. Furthermore, reliable communication at rates up to main channel capacity are achievable, which is found to be C = 0.89 nats/channel use. In Figure 7 , we illustrate that the same channel is simulatable with another adversary that experiences the same In the following examples, we only consider the adversary with RF-fingerprints W j, f . First, we evaluate the error/success exponents in Theorem 1 for R K 1 = 0.01 and R K 2 = 0, where recall that R K 1 is the rate of the key K 1 that is transmitted securely for authentication, and R K 2 is the rate of the key that is utilized to help transmit K 1 securely. We choose the constant composition codebook type P to be the distribution that achieves capacity, i.e., P = arg max P I (P, W t ). In Figure 8 , we plot the exponents in log-scale as a function of coding rate R M , where we fixed the erasure parameter to be ξ = 6.4×10 −5 . Note that the erasure exponent given no attack is fixed to ξ , and the error exponent given no attack decays to 0 as the total communication rate R M + R K 1 approaches capacity C. The substitution attack success exponent seems to increase (i.e., probability of it decreases) as R M increases. This is due to the fact that, authentication from the secret key does not work at low rates, i.e., the parameter t key is low: For authentication from keys to work, the key K 1 needs to be communicated securely to the legitimate receiver, which happens only when the bin size for authentication, depicted in Figure 3 is greater than 10 eavesdropper capacity, i.e., when
Next, we revisit the keyless authentication (R K 1 = R K 2 = 0) In Figure 9 , we plot the exponents as a function of erasure parameter ξ , where we fixed the code rate R M = 0.8C. Since the main channel is not simulatable, the impersonation success and error exponents are positive, as stated in Corollary 3. Furthermore, we can observe that there is a trade-off between the impersonation attack success probability and the erasure probability under no attack. As parameter ξ decreases, the decoding criteria in (14) becomes stricter, hence the radius of decoding regions in Figure 4 decreases, and probability of erasure under no attack increases. Consequently, probability of impersonation attack increases slightly, as observed in (42).
Finally, in Figure 10 we observe the effect of key rate on the substitution attack probability. Note that, the exponents remain positive even in the keyless case (when R K 1 = R K 2 = 0), since the main channel is not simulatable. Yet, we can see that utilizing even small amount of keys along with RF-Fingerprints can significantly improve the attack exponents (i.e., decrease the probability of attack). For instance, for a block size of n = 10000 channel use, to utilize a key stream of rate R K 1 = 0.05, the legitimate nodes only need to have a pre-shared key of size 500 nats, which would yield a ten-fold improvement on the substitution attack success exponent.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND EXTENSIONS
In this work, we evaluated the basic performance limits of RF-fingerprinting: We modeled RF-fingerprints as a fingerprint channel that is cascaded to the physical channel. We studied the effect of RF-fingerprints on authentication in the presence of an adversary that potentially initiates impersonation and substitution attacks. We evaluated the probability exponents of success, erasure and error probabilities of these attacks as a function of the equivalent RF-fingerprint channel statistics, and secret key rate. Our achievability scheme utilizes 3-dimensional binning to securely communicate secret keys for authentication, and errors-erasures decoding to exploit the RFfingerprints. We showed that, keyless authentication is possible if and only if the adversary cannot simulate the legitimate channel, a condition that we derived to check whether successful authentication is possible. In that case, communication is possible at any rate less than Shannon capacity. Furthermore, we showed that Lai et. al.'s authentication scenario [10] is a special case of our model; where the adversary channel is perfect, and the adversary channel is not less noisy than the main channel. Finally, we showed that when additional helper receiver nodes are employed for aiding authentication, the probability of substitution and impersonation attacks can be reduced significantly, as the simulatability condition is replaced with a more stringent simultaneous simulatability condition.
We believe that the following variations of the problem are also of fundamental importance: i) in addition to authentication constraint, there is also a secrecy constraint on the transmitted message: This would require utilizing the wire-tap channel formed by transmitter-to-receiver, and transmitter-to-adversary channels, to securely transmit the message (for secrecy) and the private key (for authentication) at the same time. Using this approach, it is possible to analyze the secrecy exponent [16] as well. ii) repeated authentications using the same key (and RF-Fingerprints): It has been studied in [10] for a special case of our model (without any RF-Fingerprints). Their approach of repeatedly transmitting the same key multiple times over the utilized wiretap channel may also be applicable to our model. iii) the RF-Fingerprint channels are not memoryless, continuous, and physical channels are fading: Although it may not be feasible to apply our approach (of using methodof-types) to continuous channels, it is possible to explore approaches that involve quantization.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Notation: Let us split the shared key to two parts K i ∈ {1, . . . e n R K i }, for i ∈ {1, 2}, where
Before providing the proof, we introduce some notation and convention that would be used in the proof. Firstly, to simplify notation, we will omit the limits of summations when they are clear from the dummy variables. For instance summation over possible values of the key k 1 (ork 1 ) is from 1 to e n R K 1 , and summation over the possible values of the message m (orm) is from 1 to e n R M , and so on. Secondly, we use . = sign to also represent asymptotic equality in the exponential sense (and similarly,≤ and≥). For instance, for x ∈ T P (see Chapter 2 of [11] ) and V ∈ P(Y|X ),
and
where W n t is the i.i.d. channel W t repeated over n channel uses. Here, the term (n +1) −|X ||Y| scales polynomially with n. Therefore, we will simply write, for y ∈ T V (x),
In the proof, we will also omit the sets that probability distributions belong to, as it is clear from context.
A. Codebook Construction
We utilize constant composition coding arguments to find a code c = ( f, φ) , that satisfies the exponents (15)- (20) simultaneously. First, we describe the encoder f . When secret keys k 1 , k 2 are present at the legitimate nodes, the encoder f maps each message m to a signal f (m, Figure 3 . We consider a constant composition codebook c, where each codeword x k 1 k 2 m belong to type P, i.e., x k 1 k 2 m ∈ T P , for any k 1 , k 2 , m. The existence of a good code c is proved later in Lemma 1; our secure packing lemma. Now, we describe the decoder φ for a given code c. For any received signal y, there exist conditional types
where the operator ≺ is as defined in (14), i.e., V k 1 k 2 m ≺ Vk
if the condition
holds. It can be interpreted as it prefers
and Vk
occur simultaneously, one of the codewords is chosen arbitrarily. The decoding function φ is described as
Notice that the decoding function only searches the space
. . e n R M }, whereas k 2 dimension is not searched. This is because k 1 is used for authentication, and k 2 is used to artificially increase main channel capacity, to improve the secrecy capacity, and hide the key k 1 from the adversary to protect itself from substitution attacks. Also note that, for some y, the condition (53) may not be satisfied for any k 1 , k 2 , m. We define that region as
We first provide a secure packing lemma, which utilizes the packing lemma in [11] , along with a security constraint. First, for a given k 1 ∈ {1, . . . , e n R K 1 }, conditional type V and adversary received signal z, define N z,k 1 (V ) to be the number of codewords
and also define
Lemma 1 (A Secure Packing Lemma): For any R R K 1 + R K 2 + R M and type P, there exists a constant composition codebook c = {x
. , e n R M }, of type P, such that for any two conditional types V,V , the inequalities
are satisfied. The proof is provided in Appendix B-A. In the proof, it is shown, via random, constant composition arguments that a good codebook c exists. The proof of (58)-(60) exists in similar form in the packing lemma of Csiszar and Korner [11] . The term (61) is utilized for secrecy; i.e., to show that key K 1 is communicated securely from the adversary, such that the adversary does not obtain significant information about K 1 by listening to transmissions on channel W e . To bound this term, we use the distance enumerators approach introduced in [18] . Now, we analyze the exponents for the code c.
As observed in (63), erasure may occur due to two events. First, erasure occurs if the decoder fails to decode a valid codeword (i.e., y ∈ D 0|k 2 ). Second, erasure occurs if the decoder successfully decodes to a codeword with incorrect key k 1 , i.e., if it decodes to (k 1 ,m) for somek 1 ∈ {1, . . . , e n R K 1 } such thatk 1 = k 1 , and somem ∈ {1, . . . , e n R M }, which results in erasure as a result of failed authentication. In (64), we can see that probability of erasure is upper bounded 11 by probability of not successfully decoding m, which is represented asD k 1 m|k 2 ; the complement of the set D k 1 m|k 2 .
The probability expression in (64) can be bounded as follows:
where (66) follows from (53): When keys shared are k 1 , k 2 , and signal y is received by the legitimate receiver, its decoder does not decode to message m if for some otherm andk 1 such
) hold where V ⊀V . Summing over all such V andV provides an upper bound to (65). Inequality (67) follows from (51) and (52), i.e., for any y
Asymptotic inequality (68) follows from the packing lemma equation (58), and the inequality (51). Asymptotic equality (69) follows since there are at most polynomially many number of types V (Lemma 2.2 in [11] ). Finally, (70) follows due to the definition of ≺ in (14) .
C. (Undetected) Error | No Attack
Following an analysis similar to the erasure analysis, we can similarly see that probability of error given no attack for codebook c is bounded by
where (72) follows since the decoder declares φ(y, k 1 , k 2 ) = m for some incorrect codewordm = m if y ∈ D k 1m |k 2 , and (74) follows from the packing lemma equation (59), and (51). Parameter t ena is defined in (21) .
D. Success | Substitution Attack
For the code c, the probability of substitution success can be bounded as 1
In (77), the term 12 P(z|k 1 , k 2 , m) is the probability that adversary receives signal z, given keys k 1 , k 2 are shared by the legitimate nodes, and the transmitter attempts to send message m. When the adversary receives z, in order to perform substitution attack and inject messagem, it transmits signal q on channel W j through a possibly random mapping, where f 2 (q|m, z) represents its probability mass function. Also, W j (D k 1m |k 2 |q) denotes the probability of substitution success given signal q is injected; the probability that legitimate receiver decodesm. In (79), we replace the dummy indexm with m for notational simplicity, and the inequality follows since f 2 is a valid probability mass function, and in (78) there exists a particular q that maximizes
. Inequality (80) follows similar to the inequality (79).
Note that, (80) is a product of two terms in parantheses. The first term is related to secrecy of the key K 1 from the adversary, while the second term is related the probability at which the adversary can successfully inject a message, which is decoded without error at the receiver.
We now separately bound each term in (80). The first term can be bounded as
where (81) follows due to (52), (56): given k 1 , z and any
Asymptotic quality (82) follows from (57), the fact that |T PV | . = H (PV ), and equality I (P, V ) = H (PV ) − H (V |P). From the packing lemma equation (61), and (82) we can see that
where t key is as defined in (22) . Now, we focus on the second term in (80). We will utilize a double conditional type argument. First, note that
Here, the first term in parentheses in (88) 
holds as well. Here, V Q k 1 k 2 m represents the type of received signal y conditioned on both the legitimate transmitted signal x k 1 k 2 m , and adversary signal q. Similar to (12) , define
Then, from (89), we can see that for such x k 1 k 2 m , q and y,
where (91) is proven in Appendix B-B via log-sum inequality.
From (91) and (49), we can see that (88) is bounded above by
where (93) follows due to the packing lemma equation (60), (94) follows since there are at most polynomially many types.
Combining (85), (95) we obtain
E. (Undetected) Error | Substitution Attack
Following steps similar to (80), we obtain
where the first terms in (98) and (80) 
Therefore,
F. Impersonation Attacks
Recall that impersonation attacks are a special case of substitution attacks for the case where switch 1 in Figure 1 is open, therefore the adversary does not receive any signal, i.e., z = ∅. In this case, the first term in (80) reduces to
since the adversary's received signal is independent of the key K 1 , therefore P(z|k 1 ) = P(z|k 1 ) for any k 1 , k 1 ∈ {1, . . . , e n R K 1 }. Therefore, for the impersonation success probability, we get
and similarly for the impersonation undetected error, we get
The constructed code c simultaneously satisfies all the bounds, which concludes the proof.
APPENDIX B PROOFS OF SEVERAL TERMS IN APPENDIX A
A. Proof of Lemma 1 (Packing Lemma)
We utilize random, constant composition coding arguments to find a good code c that satisfies the constraints (58)-(61). We proceed similar to the proof of packing lemma of [11] , as follows. Consider a random codebook C = {X k 1 k 2 m }, where each codeword X k 1 k 2 m , is a random vector, distributed independently, and uniformly among the set of codewords of type P. Then, an instance of this random code; c = {x k 1 k 2 m }, would be chosen with probability
Let us define a random vector X that is equal to X k 1 k 2 m in distribution. Define parameters
TV (Xk
If we can show that the asymptotic inequalities
hold, via Markov inequality, 13 this implies that there exists a code c that satisfies the inequalities
simultaneously. Due to (116), for the code c , the condition u 3 (m, c ) < 2 holds for at least e n R M /2 indices. Therefore, via expurgation, we can create another codebook c ⊂ c , by only considering the indices m ∈ {1, . . . , e n R M } that satisfies this condition. This new codebook c satisfies the conditions (58)-(61). Following the proof of Lemma 10.1 in [11] , it is straightforward to show that the inequalities (111)-(113) hold. For completeness, let us go over the proof of (111).
where (118) follows from (50), and (119) follows since distribution of X k 1 k 2 m is identical to that of X as discussed in the beginning of the proof. Furthermore,
Recall from (2) that PV (b) = a P(a)V (b|a) for any b. Then, the numerator in (120) is non-zero if and only if y ∈ T PV . LetṼ be a probability transition function such that P(a)V (b|a) = PV (b)Ṽ (a|b), for any a, b. Then, x ∈ TṼ (y), and
Combining (119), (121) we can upper bound (117) by the term
where (123) follows since |T PV | ≤ exp n H (V |P). Combining (123), and the facts i) the expression in (117) is less than or equal to 1 (since the numerator is less than or equal to the denominator) and ii) the number of types is at most polynomial in n, we can see that asymptotic equality (111) holds. The proofs of (112) and (113) follow similarly, and are omitted. We then prove (114). First, we focus on the first term of (110) and assume that V satisfies R M + R K 2 < I (P, V ). For a given z ∈ T PV , N z,k 1 (V ); the number of random
, is a binomial random variable that is a function of the codebook C. Similar to (121), we can show that for z ∈ T PV ,
We will use the fact that for any a > 0 such that
i.e., the probability decays double exponentially. The proof of (126) utilizes large deviations, and can be found in the Appendix of [18] . Let = 2 √ n . Then,
where (127) follows since N z,k 1 (V ) takes non-negative integer values and could be at most e n(R M +R K 2 ) , as there are at most e n(R M +R K 2 ) many codewords indexed with m and k 2 . We can bound the first term in (127) as
where (128) follows since e n = e 2 √ n scales slower than exponentially, (130) follows from the union bound, and the fact that (129) is upper bounded by 1. Equation (131) follows from Markov inequality and (132) follows due to (125). Similarly, the second term in (127) can be bounded as
where inequality (133) follows from the union bound, (134) follows from (126), and (135) follows since (134) decays double exponentially with n. Therefore, from (132), (135), definition of (57), and the fact that there are at most polynomially many types, we get
Similarly, focus on the second term of (110) and assume that V satisfies R M + R K 2 ≥ I (P, V ). To simplify notation let
where (140) follows since e n scales slower than exponentially, and the second term in (139) decays double exponentially with n. From (140), we get
Combining (136) and (141), we can see that (114) is satisfied.
B. Proof of (91)
For notational simplicity, let us omit the subscript index k 1 , k 2 , m. Then, for a given y ∈ T V Q (x, q), 
where (148) follows from log-sum inequality, which can be observed as follows: For any a, c, define variables 
where (151) follows similarly through log-sum inequality by choosing α b = Q(b|a) and β b = Q(b|a)V Q (c|b, a).
Combining (146), (149) and (152) proves (91).
APPENDIX C PROOF OF THEOREM 2
In order find an error exponent upper bound, we can focus on a suboptimal adversary attack scheme, without violating the bounds. Therefore, we assume that the eavesdropper uses a suboptimal strategy such that, in order to inject the messagem, it uniformly and randomly draws keyk ∈ {1, . . . , e n R K } and transmits the codeword indexed by keyk and messagem, i.e., xkm , after passing the signal xkm through a prefix discrete memoryless channel Q (in other words, the adversary ignores its received signal z). Therefore, the probability mass function f 2 of the adversary encoder satisfies
and the signal received by the legitimate receiver has the probability mass function
where W j Q = Q * W j due to (12) , and in (154) we omit the limits from the summation as it is clear from context. Therefore, for a given constant composition code c of type P, the substitution success probability can be lower bounded as 
where (157) follows similarly to (77) in Appendix A, where the lower bound is due to the suboptimal choice of f 2 .
Equality (157) follows due to (154), and the inequality (158) follows by only considering the index k =k changing the dummy indices k ←k, m ←m afterwards for simplicity. Under no attack, probability of the union of erasure and undetected error is given by where the asymptotic equality in (165) follows due to (51), and the fact that there are at most polynomially many types. Maximizing (165) over the prefix channel Q yields the result (25) .
When R K = 0, we can further bound (165) when condition (13) holds for some η < 1. Let W min (b|a) = min(W t (b|a), W j Q (b|a)) for any a, b. Note that W min is not a valid transition probability function. Due to (13), we can see 
≤ min η (a) ), without violating the inequality.
APPENDIX D PROOF OF THEOREM 3
The proof is similar to proof of Theorem 1, i.e., utilize the same codebook construction, the same secure packing lemma, and a similar decoding function, hence we only highlight the differences. Let us fix ξ > 0. The helper nodes h ∈ {2, . . . , T } have access to keys k 1 and k 2 , and based on their received signal y h , they evaluate If ψ h (y h , k 1 , k 2 ) = 1, the helper node h identifies the received signal as authentic, and sends ψ h (AUTH packet) to the legitimate receiver node 1. Otherwise, node h identifies the received signal as not authentic and sends a NOT_AUTH packet to node 1. Therefore, the authenticated helper nodes h ∈ {2, . . . , T } only check whether an erasure event occurs. The decoding function φ at node 1 is then described as
and ψ h = 0, ∀h ∈ {2, . . . , T } 0, otherwise
The main difference of the decoder φ from the decoder described in Appendix A is that, node 1 also declares an erasure if ψ h = 0 for some node h ∈ {1, . . . , T }.
We now highlight the differences in exponent analysis. For the described code c, probability of erasure given no attack is bounded as, 
